Listening With Empathy

March 18, 2012

Call for Participation: Empathy Conference

What is empathy and what do we need it for?

At Södertörn University August 16-18, 2012, arranged by Centre for Studies in Practical Knowledge

The last ten years we have witnessed an exploding interest in the phenomenon of empathy. The wave of empathy studies is psychology, philosophy, psychiatry and other disciplines is linked to a parallel theoretical interest in the phenomena of feeling, selfhood, inter-subjectivity and morality, but also to practical attempts to understand and improve meetings between workers and clients in different professions, such as health care professions, teaching professions, psychotherapy or social work. To be empathic is increasingly viewed as a must for any person working in cooperation with and/or helping other people, although, as is also pointed out, the empathy must be professional in character to not produce destructive intimacy or burn out. The question of what “professional empathy” might be and how it is possible, or, indeed, fruitful to attain such ability is an interesting one in itself.

The theoretical underpinnings of empathy studies roughly divide it into two camps: the theory-theory approaches, and the simulation-theory approaches. The ideas that to have a theory of mind or an ability to put oneself in the shoes of another are necessary for empathy can serve either as philosophical clarifications of empathy or as taken for granted starting points of the empathy studies; in both cases, however, it is becoming increasingly evident by way of empirical results as well as conceptual clarification that the two approaches are relying on ideas of inter-subjective understanding which do not get the relationships between feeling, thought and action in empathy exactly right. To be empathic does not seem to consist in being able to think that the other is like me, or imagining what it is like to be him, in feeling or acting on his behalf. It is true that most adults that show empathy are able to think and imagine that the other is like me and what it would be like to be in his predicament, but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for being empathic. Rather these two abilities can reinforce and develop an empathic attitude which in its basic form is developed as a feeling in its own right.

To talk about affective and cognitive empathy as two parts or stages of the phenomenon does not solve the issue of how the two belong together, and it, indeed, seems to leave the account of action (acting in order to help the person one feels and understands is suffering) out of empathy altogether. Most suffering persons would surely prefer a fellow being who actually does something for them in contrast to just telling them that they understand and feel sorry for them. This issue connects the discussion of what empathy is to ethics. Is empathy a corner stone of morality, perhaps a necessary constituent in the makeup of every moral subject, or is it rather a bad substitute for ethical concepts such as respect and responsibility, allowing people to think and say that they really know what it is to be in the position of the other, and perhaps, also, to feel sorry for the other rather than doing anything about his suffering?

In the conference we want to gather academics and practitioners from different disciplines who try to move beyond (not beside) the theory-theory and the simulation-theory approaches to empathy. We want to address the question of what empathy is from an empirical as well as theoretical perspective, and we want to connect the issue to what role empathy serves in the development of human beings as well as the exercise of human based professions. Abstracts for presentations addressing these issues and not exceeding 600 words should be sent to the conference secretary martin.gunnarson@sh.se no later than the 15 of April (2012). Final program will be distributed in May 2012.

Fredrik Svenaeus and Martin Gunnarson

Keynote speakers:

Lou Agosta, Chicago School of Professional Psychology

Thomas Fuchs, University of Heidelberg

Jodi Halpern, University of California Berkeley

Matthew Ratcliffe, Durham University

Jan Slaby, Freie Universität Berlin

Speaking personally (and this is Lou Agosta speaking), I struggle with a misunderstanding about my work in empathy studies. When I say that I work on empathy that sometimes lands int he listening of the audience as if empathy were only over here with me and “over there” with the audience was a need for more or better or different empathy. This is misunderstanding. Empathy does NOT belong to any one individual. It lives in the relatedness between speaker and listener. It lives in the community. Empathy in any form or context causes expanded empathy in every form and context.

November 25, 2009

One more thought on “experimental philosophy”…

Experimental philosophy really started to get traction in John Locke’s engaging answer to William Molyneux’s thought experiment about the individual blind from birth who suddenly gets his vision. What happens? In a daring experiment, which gives the subtitle to the book, Crashing Through: The Man Who Dared to See (Kurson 2007), Mike May’s immune system was chemically “killed” so that a stem cell transplant could be used to restore the nerves in his retina. As a result, May’s eyes and optics were restored to a state that was near perfect. This is in contrast to the experience of the visual world that he encountered after the bandages were removed following the last in a series of operations to restore his sight. The operation was a success in that the optical apparatus was functioning as designed. But there was a “but…” In short, the auto at which May was supposedly looking did not make sense as a visual experience. More precisely, Mike’s visual experience of the auto or other things did not make sense. His visual apparatus did not make sense out of the inputs that the experience of the would-be yellow auto was providing. His visual apparatus did integrate the input caused by the auto (which auto, of course, was available through other sensory modes). Given his visual experience, Mike was inferring that the auto was yellow; he was not in direct contact with the yellow station wagon. Note well that Mike May was inferring that the auto was yellow, which means he was not directly in touch with it – this was not normal. This must be underscored. May’s use of inference to get in touch visually with the auto was significantly different than what everyone else does. In spite of all the operations, he did not have normal vision. The swirling constellation of colors and shapes did not have sense as a coherent, unified, objective thing with a spatial boundary. This counts towards Searle’s naïve realistic point that viewers do not infer things, they see them, relate to them, interact with them, etc. However, this also counts as evidence that sense and the sense of objects in the world is constituted by acts of intentionality that are prepredicative, nonlinguistic, nonverbal – in this case, acts of intentional synthesis of the kind invoked by the later Husserl. What did you think the experiment was going to show?
One lesson? Maybe the experiments collected by Knobe and Nichols (Knobe and Nichols, Experimental Philosophy) were good, but they were not that good. Maybe the analysis was good, but not that good. The idea that analytic philosophy – or any philosophy (Continental, Oriental, etc.) – has to be protected from experimental philosophy is questionable. (See http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/experimental_philosophy/2009/11/levin-on-xphi.html – a site worth noting in any case.)
Another lesson? Philosophers ignore the advances of empirical science at their own peril. It is particularly interesting when diverse Gedanken experiments have the brains (central nervous systems (CNS)) of individuals hooked up by imaginary wires. Depending on where you draw the system boundary, different philosophical paradoxes arise. (This deserves further discussion, forthcoming.) Meanwhile, science advances. Then it turns up that people are indeed already hooked up by the action of mirror neurons. True, there is still action-at-a-distance – but that makes it even more interesting. This is also where the connection with empathy occurs (though this post does not explore it.) Philosophers then have to change the Gedanken experiment so that the hook is not too similar to what we now know to be the case in the everyday world – we are connected (and sometimes corrected) in fundamental ways experientially as our organisms resonate in reaction to one another. Please do not tell me that Descartes ever envisioned that one as he sat alone in his warm room meditating on first philosophy.
The third lesson? The main threat to analytic philosophy (or continental philosophy or your choice of philosophy) is not experimental philosophy. It is analytic philosophy and please make the corresponding substitutions for Continental, Oriental, etc. As soon as philosophers loose touch with the method of sustained inquiry that drove Socrates, Wittgenstein, Nietzsche, Austin, etc. the game is up. What Kant called “dialectical illusion” looms large and curious puzzles take the place of fundamental inquiry into the big issues that attract students, professionals, people to philosophy in the first place. Further details on the strengths and limitations of experimental philosophy are to be found in an unpublished essay by yours truly on the relevance of neuro-phenomenology to the philosophy of empathy subtitled “The Light Goes on!” at this site.

The Philosophical Significance of Neurology for Empathy – The Light Goes on!!!

Join me in a conversation about empathy and neurology.  The short version is that the individual experiences empathy and the light goes on! Today’s inquiry explores the philosophical significance for empathy of the research on the mirror neurons, the related shared manifold hypothesis, micro expressions and the investigations that have grown up around them. Three of the consequences will be explicitly addressed. Evidence that such a capacity as empathy exists at all will be provided, but in the ironic spirit of proofs of common sense. In turn, the inquiry into existence will lead to the rehabilitation of introspection as a method of investigation proper to empathy, albeit with certain conditions and qualifications. Finally, the scope and limits of the shared manifold hypothesis, which conceptually implements the functional and causative role of mirror neurons, will be engaged. The result will be that the shared manifold is less transparent the more that it is shared. A bigger magnet will not make a difference.  [Please see chphilsignifempathyneurology20081118 ]

November 3, 2009

Empathy and Analogy: Mindreading and Simulation

The argument of this post is that mindreading, theory of mind (“mentalizing”), and simulation theory are fundamentally flawed. What is lacking is empathy. It is not that these do not mention “empathy.” It occurs as both the target of explanation as well as an explanatory mechanism. The argument is rather that empathy is missing in the sense that the world of emotions, expressions of life, including the emotions, and the humanness opened up by empathy are not satisfactorily simulated by mindreading. But including empathy will not save mindreading which is a flawed and misleading approach from the start. This is a bold statement for which additional argument and evidence is provided.

At its best, mindreading is a research program derivative on experiments in false belief (and a set of closely related experiments), mirror neurons, and the extension of the metaphor of simulation to the neurology of the human biocomputer. Paradoxically, this puts the approach of mindreading on the slippery slope to skepticism about the existence of other minds. Just when it seems safe to rehabilitate introspection as a form of data gathering relevant to simulation, the classic conundrum of the multiple meanings of mental concepts between the first- and third-person perspectives erupts. Several solutions are proposed by the proponents of mindreading, none entirely satisfactory. As a result of the skeptical threat, mindreading is unable to take advantage of the power of analogical thinking, since it must avoid reference to the argument from analogy, which is notorious for not being a solution to doubts about other minds. But it is precisely with analogical thinking and computational model building that the power of simulation lies. The detailed argument is available: CHEmpathyandAnalogy20081124

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