EmpathyInTheContextOfPhilosophy

May 4, 2010

Advanced Praise for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy

I am humbled by the comments of my colleagues, friends, and associates.

“An insightful and provocative exploration of a topic that has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves and the conceptual clarity needed for a proper understanding. Agosta’s study is rich in historical context and thorough in covering the intersections of philosophy and psychology on the question of empathy. It is also accessible and stimulating for a host of applications to current concerns. Agosta rightly, in my view, finds in Heidegger a primary vehicle for advancing the discussion, yet he has his own voice and sense of how to think it through. An impressive achievement.”

Lawrence J. Hatab
Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy
Old Dominion University
*************************************************
That much used and routinely abused word, empathy, has enjoyed an uncomfortable popularity in fields as disparate as politics and psychoanalysis. At last a philosopher has arrived to bring clarity to the confusion. Lou Agosta has brought together the salient points about empathy as seen in neurology, psychoanalysis and literature into a happy home under Heidegger. Heidegger calls for ‘a special hermeneutic of empathy’ but does not give one. Agosta delivers it. The book is a must-read for anyone who chooses to use the word again.

Arnold Goldberg, M.D.

Author, Misunderstanding Freud

Professor of Psychiatry

Rush University Medical College

***************************************************************

Lou Agosta’s Empathy in the Context of Philosophy is a vivid, sweeping, thought-provoking and attitude changing treatment of one of the central, if often neglected, ideas of our culture, namely Empathy. It collects and scrutinizes ideas from a remarkable array of sources — from neuroscience to hermeneutics, from analytic philosophy to Freudian psychoanalysis, from Grimm Brothers stories to speech acts — all the while demonstrating Empathy’s seminal role in our understanding of mind, ethics, and ourselves. If morality stands apart from empathy, Dr. Agosta also shows how it is a pre-condition of it. He does this, and quite a bit more, through a lively tour of much of Twentieth Century thought, all the way correcting some of that thought’s myopia and self-righteousness, and allows us to regain a fine understanding, perhaps lost in the travails of modern life, of what it is that both makes us human and provides the possibility of joy with others.

Joel Levin

Author of Tort Wars and of Marrano Justice

Joel Levin, Esq.

Levin & Associates Co., L.P.A.

*************************************************************

Empathy in the Context of Philosophy is a masterpiece of philosophical-historical scholarship, presenting a rich and comprehensive account of the explicit and implicit conceptions of empathy that have appeared in the course of Western thinking from Hume through contemporary phenomenologists, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. Agosta’s Heideggerian interpretation of empathy is truly a tour de force. In Being and Time Heidegger criticized traditional Cartesian conceptions of empathy and called for a “special hermeneutic of empathy,” presumably grounded in his analysis of existence, but he failed to offer such a hermeneutic himself. It is this missing hermeneutic of empathy that Agosta supplies, masterfully applying Heidegger’s modes of Dasein’s disclosedness to elucidate the design structure of empathic engagement, which Agosta rightfully claims constitutes the foundation of authentic relationality. This book will be an invaluable resource not only for scholars in philosophy and the human sciences, but for practitioners of psychoanalytic and humanistic psychotherapy as well.

–Robert D. Stolorow, Ph.D. [Psychology], Ph.D. [Philosophy]

Author, Trauma and Human Existence (Routledge, 2007)

http://robertdstolorow.googlepages.com for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy”]Cover Art for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy[/caption]

April 5, 2010

Heidegger on the Emotions and Aristotle’s Rhetoric

Filed under: Emotions,Hermeneutics,Philosophy — Lou Agosta @ 10:27 am
Tags: , , , ,

In BEING AND TIME, Heidegger famously notes that the analysis of the affects (pathe) has taken barely one step forward since book II of Aristotle’s RRHETORIC (H139). This Hot Link is an essay on this subject – click following here – HeideggerVol2420100324

The occasion for this reengagement with the possibility of a ‘step forward’ is the availability of Heidegger’s lecture course at the University of Marburg in 1924 on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy. This course includes a detailed analysis of book II of the RHETORIC as volume 18 of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe (2002) just translated (2009). Here Heidegger’s penetrating but sparse remarks in BEING AND TIME on Befindlichkeit [‘affectivity’] are deepened and implemented in his reading of Aristotle’s RHETORIC.

The relevance of this reengagement is direct. The dominant view of the affects in contemporary philosophy is arguably the position that affects are an unclearly expressed proposition, including the cognitively articulated propositional attitude. The position of this short paper is that the modern propositional account of the affects is cleared away by and does not survive a reading of Heidegger’s volume 18 on book II of Aristotle’s RHETORIC.

Lest someone think this is a trivial matter, the long and distinguished tradition going back to the Stoics in which affects are indistinct cognitions that require clarification is well articulated in modern times by Anthony Kenny and then in Martha Nussbaum’s monumental Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Please click on the above-cited essay for further details. Let me know what you think. Thanks!

February 8, 2010

The Comparison between Empathy and Taste (Aesthetic) In Kant’s Third Critique

This post explores the parallel – the analogy – between empathy and taste. Such a parallel is justified by invoking the tradition in which empathy is made the basis of aesthetics. Instead of regarding this basis as a historical confusion, the grain of truth to which this tradition points is explicated in terms of an analogy between taste (in the Kantian sense) and empathy. A full, robust definition of empathy makes use of the four moments of the judgment of aesthetic taste – disinterestedness, universality, purposiveness without finality, and necessity. Empathy then also brings in the concept of the other. This conversation is possible because empathy recruits the same underlying aspects of the human mental appartus as does taste – the sensus communis in both forms– though it is applied differently. Please see – KantTasteEmpathy20090902

January 23, 2010

Empathy and Intersubjectivity – the Legacy

As noted on the first page of the attached article, “intersubjectivity” is understood in the article to mean our interrelated being together with one another in the interhuman world of regard for and sensitivity to the feelings of other individuals (persons). My contacts in the psychoanalytic community have told me that, since the mid-1980s when my article was first published, “intersujbectivity” has taken on a life of its own in the context of self psychology and relational theory, the latter reportedly alternatingly competing with and cooperating with self psychology is a (mostly) friedly rivalry. Without wishing to claim priority, I merely note that I was not familiar with this psychoanalytic literature on intersubjectivity at the time – though, of course, ‘object relations’ was a familiar literature – either because it [intersubjective approach] only existed in nascent form in scattered article or because I simply overlooked its significance. I would be please to be corrected on the dates and emergence of the literature (so please feel free to leave a comment below). However, with the publication of Robert Stolorow and G.E. Atwood’s (1994) Contexts of Being: The Intersubjective Foundations of Psychological Life, among other works, the intersubjective approach comes into its own. At this point, my intention is to note the distinction in the development of the term “intersubjectivity” without pretending to give an account of the points of convergence or divergence. That remains a future task to be engaged. By the way, as far as I know, the attached PDF is not otherwise available in electronic form, and you will have to use the rotate feature on your PDF reader to rotate the pages 90 degrees or, failing that, print a hard copy to read. After having received numerous requests for it, I felt it better to make it available in some form, even if only as an imperfectly captured electronic image. See EmpathyIntersubjectivitybyAgosta

January 21, 2010

The Recovery of Empathy in a Folktale

A wonderful example of empathy and its absence is documented in one of the fairy tales (Märchen) of the collection edited by the Grimm Brothers. “The Story of the Youth Who Set Out to Learn Fear” is about a youth – the classic simpleton of the folktale – who tries to learn what shuddering is (i.e., fear in the sense of “goose flesh”). The hero-simpleton tries so hard to feel fear that he is effectively defended against all feelings. He has no feelings, not even fear. He is insensitive to others’ feelings in the everyday sense. Thus, he lacks empathy and the corresponding aspects of his being human (humanness). He is also ontologically cut off from the community of fellow travelers who share feelings empathically and on the basis of which life matters to them (and him). This deficiency occasions a misunderstanding in the narrative with the sacristan at the local church, and the youth throws the latter down the stairs, resulting in the youth’s disgrace and banishment. As in all classic folktales, the hero goes forth on a journey of exploration of both the world and of himself. He becomes a traveler on the road of life, which is the beginning of his ontological adventures to recover his feelings and become a complete human being.

For those interested, here is further detail on the story itself.  Märchen von Einem der auzog das Fürchten zu lernen,  translated as “The story of the youth who went forth to learn what fear was” in The Complete Grimm’s Fairy Tale, (1814/17), ed. W. Grimm and J. Grimm, tr. M. Hunt and J. Stern. New York: Pantheon Books, 1972: 29f. “Grüseln” means literally “to shudder” or “get the creeps,” “goose bumps,” a classic physical expression of fear. In the Anthropology (1797: §16; 33; 154), Kant calls out “The thrill that comes over us at the mere idea of the sublime and the gooseflesh [grüseln] with which fairy tales put children to bed late at night are vital sensations; they permeate the body so far as there is life in it.” The point is, anyone lacking such an experience, as depicted in the Märchen, is hardly alive, is an emotional zombie.  Bruno Bettelheim does not call out the link with empathy in his treatment of this folktale in his The Uses of Enchantment ((1975) New York: Alfred Knopf: 280-82); though, as I recall, Professor Bettelheim did make the connection in classroom discussion that I attended at the University of Chicago in the Spring of 1975. On the relevance of folktales to philosophy see, L. Agosta. (1978). “Kant’s treasure hard-to-attain,” Kant-Studien, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1978: 422-443; and also L. Agosta. (1980). “The recovery of feelings in a folktale,” Journal of Religion and Health, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter 1980: 287-97. Meanwhile….

The point is that empathy is not an obscure capability that requires elaborate technology to make it visible, as when researchers deploy a functional magnetic resonance imaging apparatus (fMRI) to correlate mirror neurons (though we can learn from the latter too). Rather empathy hides in plain view. This folktale, this Märchen, is in fact a ghost story, to be told on dark, windy autumn nights. The empathy of the audience is aroused by constellating fearful images of the living dead. This makes for a series of humorous encounters with ghouls and haunted castles as the youth sets about trying to learn shuddering – compulsively saying “I wish I could shudder,” having no idea what it means. The hero performs many brave deeds instead – as he is literally not sensible enough to grasp the distinction “fear” and recognize when he should be afraid. The ghost story provides a framework for images of the disintegration and fragmentation of the self, including literal ghoulish images of bowling with detached heads and a corpse that rises from the dead because the youth gets into bed with it to warm it up – a scenario quite creepy – against which the youth is firmly defended by his complete lack of feeling. None of these images and events matter to him in the way they would matter to an affectively, emotionally whole person. He is surrounded by ghouls and living corpses but, ontologically speaking, he is the one who is an affective zombie, emotionally dead. Without empathy, the individual is emotionally cut-off, i.e., dead.

The subtext of the story is that the individual cannot recover his humanity on his own. He requires the participation of another – and a relationship with the other – to restore the being human (humanness) of his feelings – and to teach him how to shudder. Having raised the curse on the haunted castle and won the hand of the fair princess, the hero finally stops trying to shudder. Only then is he overcome by shuddering at the first opportune occasion. On the morning after his wedding night – his new wife teaches him shuddering – no, this is not going where you think – she teaches him shuddering in a pun that cleverly masks the physical and sexual innuendo – she throws bowl of cold water filled with gold fish on him with the flipping gold fish included – he wakes up exclaiming that “Ach, yah, now finally I know shuddering!” Now he is finally a whole, enriched, and complete human being. Here is the original essay – caution the word “emapthy” does not occur in this essay. However, I suggest that empathy is what immediately underlies the capacity for feeling that forms the pivotal challenge faced by the protagonist in the folktale. For more details see -

JRHRecoveryFeelingFolktaleAgosta


January 18, 2010

Intersecting Conversations in Philosophy and Psychoanalysis

The therapeutic dimension of philosophy attempts to give the ultimate philosophic question – those of freedom, God, and immortality – a proper place in thinking. They lie at the limits of conceptual intelligibility. Borrowing a phrase from Karl Jaspers – who, according to Hannah Arendt, was the only true Kantian since Kant – these are boundary (limit) questions, in turn, pointing to limit conditions and experiences of human existence (Existenz). These questions inevitably transcend the limits of any language whose field of reference is sense perception. They are undecidable through the use of our finite sense. They show human beings at their most anxious and vulnerable moments, facing death, life, and the finitude of time in the world of man. In the archeological metaphor of the ancient city, Freud’s language intersects directly with that of Wittgenstein. Quoting the latter: ‘Our language can be seen as an ancient city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses [1945: p. 8; paragraph 18]. Of course, Freud’s use of the ancient analogy is different than Wittgenstein’s. Freud wants to suggest that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish (1930, p. 69): ‘We ask ourselves how much a visitor, whom we will suppose to be equipped with the most complete historical and topographical knowledge, may still find left of these early stages in the Rome of today. Except for a few gaps, he will see the wall of Aurelian almost unchanged. In some places he will be able to find sections of the Servian wall where they have been excavated and brought to light. If he knows enough – more than present day archaeology does – he may perhaps be able to trace out in the plan of the city the whole course of that wall….’ [1930: p. 69]. Although primitive psychic structures and defenses have been replace by modern ones, still the foundations remain. Further details are attached.

Caution – the attached file is large (21MB)  – so if it does not load for you, please leave me a comment and i will break it up into parts, okay? For further details see – IJPPPsychoanalysisandPhilosophyAgosta and part two – IJPPPsychoanalysisandPhilosophyAgostaPart2

January 17, 2010

Kant’s Treasure Hard-to-Attain: Why Kant Scholars are Engaged by Folktales

In the Anthropology (1797: §16; 33; 154), Kant calls out “The thrill that comes over us at the mere idea of the sublime and the gooseflesh [grüseln] with which fairy tales put children to bed late at night are vital sensations; they permeate the body so far as there is life in it.” The point is, anyone lacking such an experience, as depicted in the Märchen, is hardly alive, is an emotional zombie. But this discussion goes beyond the one explicit example in Kant to the issue of the highest good, a moral idea of which we have no decisive experience. In our human lives, rarely is virtue rewarded, and when such a thing happens it is as often by accident or a happy good fortune, and nothing like a strict causal connection. Still, for those, like Kant,relying on a healthy human understanding, who are persuaded that the world is governed by rules and is a cosmos, not a radom chaos, the underling reason (rationality) urges that virtue should be rewarded. According to Kant (1785: 21/404): ‘But the most remarkable thing about ordinary reason in its practical concern is that it may have as much hope as any philosopher of hitting the mark. In fact, it is almost more certain to do so than the philospoher, because he has no principle which the common understanding lacks, while his judgement is easily confused by a mass of irrelevant considerations…’  Textual evidence is available that Kant regarded the dialectical concept of the highest good as the possession of the ordinary person’s reason (1790, II: 128-9;458). Indeed,  in this case, saying that the ordinary person contradicts himself in confusion is not necessarily a reproach from which the philosopher escapes. The short answer is that Kant scholars are engaged by folktales because certain of the latter are sourced in aesthetic ideas that depict the highest good, which is nowhere else exemplified in our human experience. Taking a step outside the explicit framework of Kant’s practical philosophy is a radical move, but, I submit, a necessary one if we are to make sense of Kant’s appeal to untutored reason.  The details are complex and require further argument – KantStudienKantsTreasureHardToAttainAgosta

January 7, 2010

Engaging Heidegger’s Special Hermeneutic of Empathy for Self Psychology – the presentation

This is a presentation engaging Heidegger’s Special Hermeneutic of Empathy from the perspective of Heinz Kohut’s Self Pscyhology. A shortened version of this is scheduled to be delivered at the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis on Wednesday Feb 24th at 1:30 PM (13th floor 122 S. Michigan Ave). Open to the public – though it is always advisable to call ahead to verify the logistics and if you want to get the service lerning unit – right now, the snow is coming down in big globs here in Chicago. This is a draft. If you have any questions/inquiries that you would like me to address in the talk, please post a comment and I will address the matter in the talk (or if the answer is too long or complex, I will communicate the details separately via an email (so provide one)). Makes sense? 

  • This work takes its start from

– One idea in Kohut: the loss of the selfobject’s empathy leaves one apathetic, lethargic, depressed, a sense of not being human (e.g., p. 200 (How Does Analysis Cure))  and from …

- One line in Heidegger’s Being and Time where he calls for “a special hermeneutic of empathy [Einfühlung]” but does not give one – this talk is NOT psycho-biography, but (if it were) one might say that empathy was what was missing from the biography (and the psyche)…Please see attached for the PDF of the ppt… LFCAgostaEmpathy20090212

January 6, 2010

Cover Art for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy, the book

Here is the cover art for Empathy in the Context of Philosopy. The picture is the top third of a weaving by Alex Zonis, my wife. The complete weaving, consisting of 250,000 teeny-tiny glass beads can be seen at www.mostlyglass.com under her name (Zonis). Check it out. My ‘friends’ are telling me ‘Well, at least there is some talent in the family!’ In order to get at the text on the back cover, you may need to see the separate post entitled Advanced Praise for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy. I am humbled by the comments of my colleagues and friends.

Cover Art by Alex Zonis for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy

Advance Praise for Empathy in the Context of Philosophy

I am humbled by the comments of my colleagues, friends, and associates.

“An insightful and provocative exploration of a topic that has only recently begun to receive the attention it deserves and the conceptual clarity needed for a proper understanding. Agosta’s study is rich in historical context and thorough in covering the intersections of philosophy and psychology on the question of empathy. It is also accessible and stimulating for a host of applications to current concerns. Agosta rightly, in my view, finds in Heidegger a primary vehicle for advancing the discussion, yet he has his own voice and sense of how to think it through. An impressive achievement.”

Lawrence J. Hatab
Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy
Old Dominion University
*************************************************
That much used and routinely abused word, empathy, has enjoyed an uncomfortable popularity in fields as disparate as politics and psychoanalysis.  At last a philosopher has arrived to bring clarity to the confusion.  Lou Agosta has brought together the salient points about empathy as seen in neurology, psychoanalysis and literature into a happy home under Heidegger.  Heidegger calls for ‘a special hermeneutic of empathy’ but does not give one. Agosta delivers it. The book is a must-read for anyone who chooses to use the word again.

 Arnold Goldberg, M.D.

Author, Misunderstanding Freud

Professor of Psychiatry

Rush University Medical College

***************************************************************

Lou Agosta’s Empathy in the Context of Philosophy is a vivid, sweeping, thought-provoking and attitude changing treatment of one of the central, if often neglected, ideas of our culture, namely Empathy.  It collects and scrutinizes ideas from a remarkable array of sources — from neuroscience to hermeneutics, from analytic philosophy to Freudian psychoanalysis, from Grimm Brothers stories to speech acts — all the while demonstrating Empathy’s seminal role in our understanding of mind, ethics, and ourselves.  If morality stands apart from empathy, Dr. Agosta also shows how it is a pre-condition of it.  He does this, and quite a bit more, through a lively tour of much of Twentieth Century thought, all the way correcting some of that thought’s myopia and self-righteousness, and allows us to regain a fine understanding, perhaps lost in the travails of modern life, of what it is that both makes us human and provides the possibility of joy with others.

                                                                Joel Levin

                                                                Author of Tort Wars and of Marrano Justice

  Joel Levin, Esq.

Levin & Associates Co., L.P.A.

*************************************************************

Empathy in the Context of Philosophy is a masterpiece of philosophical-historical scholarship, presenting a rich and comprehensive account of the explicit and implicit conceptions of empathy that have appeared in the course of Western thinking from Hume through contemporary phenomenologists, both philosophical and psychoanalytic. Agosta’s Heideggerian interpretation of empathy is truly a tour de force. In Being and Time Heidegger criticized traditional Cartesian conceptions of empathy and called for a “special hermeneutic of empathy,” presumably grounded in his analysis of existence, but he failed to offer such a hermeneutic himself. It is this missing hermeneutic of empathy that Agosta supplies, masterfully applying Heidegger’s modes of Dasein’s disclosedness to elucidate the design structure of empathic engagement, which Agosta rightfully claims constitutes the foundation of authentic relationality. This book will be an invaluable resource not only for scholars in philosophy and the human sciences, but for practitioners of psychoanalytic and humanistic psychotherapy as well.

–Robert D. Stolorow, Ph.D. [Psychology], Ph.D. [Philosophy]

   Author, Trauma and Human Existence (Routledge, 2007)  

http://robertdstolorow.googlepages.com

************************************************************

Next Page »

Blog at WordPress.com.